In a film where the hero breaks into the bedroom of the heroine and rapes her, why did the Johnson Office object only to the courtroom speech at the end (Branden 21)? Why did New York Times reviewer Bosley Crowther find “this tale most vulnerable on the point of the architect’s acquittal and the arguments therefore” (8)? Part of the answer is that Ayn Rand, author of the 1943 novel and the screenplay of the 1949 film adaptation of The Fountainhead, saw to it that ideas registered foremost in all encounters with her works. Loudest applause and strongest censure alike were most likely to be responses to the philosophy these works promoted, which, in the film, finds its boldest expression in the courtroom speech.

Rand also promoted her philosophy in nonfiction books, magazine articles, interviews and, in 1947, in testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). In these and other instances, as in her fiction, Rand returns so often and so forcefully to her philosophy’s core precepts that the whole of it might faithfully be described as an exultation of “the individual” and an abhorrence of “the collective.” In America, the definition of “individual” has not been so absolute, and notions about collectives have shifted depending on which collective was under consideration, and when.

The fixity of Rand’s philosophic likes and dislikes makes her discourses stand like beacons by which some cultural transformations that went on around them may be charted. In particular, her philosophy stands in helpful juxtaposition to a national consensual shift in which a dominant notion of “the individual” became grafted to a duplicitous set of ideas that Americans, by 1949, had attached to “the collective.” However, before examining The Fountainhead as a lodestar over cold war America, we will examine another, more familiar model for relating this film to its times.

Howard Roark has decided to defend himself in court for dynamiting the Corlant PRIVATE home he attached to “the collective.” However, before examining The Fountainhead as a lodestar over cold war America, we will examine another, more familiar model for relating this film to its times.

Howard Roark has decided to defend himself in court for dynamiting the Corlant/Homes housing development, an act to which he freely admits. His defense consists of a speech about individualism and collectivism. In the novel he tells the jury that collectivists have “swallowed most of Europe” (685). In the film he tells them that “much of the earth has been destroyed.” In the novel Roark calls collectivists “gangsters” and “dictators” (683) and “tyrants” and “emperors” (684). In the film he calls them not one of these names. In the film, the emphasis is not on tyrannical heads of state but colorless masses.
Roirk tells the jury in the film:

The parasite seeks power. He wants to bind all men together in common action and common sacrifice every. He claims that man is only a great mass as they think, act as they act, and live in selfless joyous servitude to any need his own... Every horror and destruction came from attempts to force men into a herd of brainless, all-purpose robots, without personal rights, without personal ambitions, with will, hope, or dignity.

Hitler does not leap to mind as a real-world example of this sort of parasite. On the whole, changes in Roirk’s speech seem to reflect the shift, in America, from a hot war against fascism to a cold war against communism, and Raymond Dugnart seems to offer insight as to how it happened—that “in a relatively close-knit society like Hollywood’s, everyone will respond to some of the moods and issues in the American air” (17).

However, zeitgeist approaches lead to wrong conclusions in this case. If Hollywood’s close-knit system typically responded in the manner Dugnart describes, then Dugnart provides our first clue to understanding this atypical film in relation to its screenwriter’s interactions with the studio that produced it. We can look to Dugnart for more clues to the story, by examining his attempt to fit The Fountainhead into an autotourist survey of the films of King Vidor.

“With The Fountainhead, Vidor boldly sets out to storm the citadel,” Dugnart begins, but then he proceeds more cautiously (30). He finds Vidor mostly just maundering the screenwriter’s ideas, sometimes emphasizing and sometimes softening them (31). Likewise, he hears the director’s voice mostly in second-part harmony with Rand’s, in whose script “Vidor clearly found a useful tool for expressing some of his own beliefs, though it remains unclear where Miss Rand’s end and Vidor’s begin” (31). Dugnart wonders where Vidor might have wanted to change the script and, at one point, spots Vidor in “the speed and control of Roirk’s reactions” (32)—a citing suggesting that more fundamental elements of mise-en-scène appear, to Dugnart, to have been previously set. The space between the screenwriter and film flowering fairly good space for automatic behavior patterns. The problem is with the cast that determines their actions and shapes the narrative and the film.

In place of psychologically motivated characters and the film Hollywood typically built around them, Vidor found “a film with an idea that it clings to with such complete and utter faith that the end result is a cold, emotionless, logocentric figure” (29 June 1949, 14). The force at the center of this film is ideologically motivated causality. Dugnart observes that The Fountainhead “avoids the characteristic Hollywood ambiguities” (31). His observation (itself somewhat ambiguous) signals a reaction to the absence of convenient oppositions between Rand’s character and i.e., of temporarily or residually unresolved questions about psychological motivations or the “theme” of the film. The architect’s acquittal and the arguments (and events) therefore leave most of the first type of question unasked, and no doubt whatsoever about the answer to the second.

One of the film’s stylistic excesses and one of Warners’ marketing strategies can be understood as attempts to disguise the oddball product the studio had on its hands. The copious score seems intended to compensate for the lack of Hollywood-style realism and drama, an impression that struck at least to two other viewers: Variety wrote that “a sound score by Max Steiner and other competent technical assists to help cloak the plot” (29 June 1949, 14); and Crowther wrote that Vidor “has worked for his emotion, the cutting, heavy musical backing and having his actors speak and behave in solemn style” (9 July 1949, 8). Another attempt to paper over the unorthodoxy is a full-page Variety advertisement placing Darooq (Gary Cooper) manfully gripping a helpless Dominique (Patricia Neal), with this line over their heads: “No man takes what’s mine!” (1 June 1949, 21). The passion driving Rand’s characters was only secondarily for each other, though, and primarily for ideas.

Did the public register the difference? Do box-office figures support or contradict claims we might infer from the negative reviews? The Fountainhead was a commercial success. It was the 38th highest grossing film of 1949 and took in $2.1 million, a figure well above that predicted by Rand and Jack Warner couldn’t prevail to at least modify Ayn Rand’s comic-strip dialogue” (31). The finished product and Rand’s taped recollections bear out the accuracy of Dugnart’s observation, although it could be expanded in two directions: First, the combined power consisted of more than three individuals; and second, Rand controlled more than dialogue. Navasky describes the balance of “culture vs. commerce, message vs. entertainment, formulas vs. originality” in Hollywood studio product, a balance owing in large measure to the just the sort of collective processing that Rand found categorically intolerable (76). Accordingly, she swung each of Navasky’s scales to the side of her choosing, restraining Hollywood’s recuperative (or masking) power over outlaw scripts until it exerted little more on this film than the the typewriter had on her novel.

She secured this control mainly through her screenplay. On one level, Rand’s ideology checked studio and directorial intervention by informing a disposition that was unreactive to collective modes of production. On another level, Rand’s ideology led out of sequence or deference to the way it was forcibly inscribed in the film. It is not possible to turn some scripts into classical Hollywood cinema without changing them. David Bordwell, Janet Staiger, and Kristin Thompson place characters at the centers of classical Hollywood narratives, engaging them in plots driven by psychologically motivated causality, and argue that this center applies deterministic stylistic pressure out to a classical film’s edges (13). While there might be more of a gradation of applicability than these authors generally claim, their description is useful here because it describes just about any classical film better than it does The Fountainhead.

There was little Vidor or anyone else could do to bring this film into line because it was driven by characters with unconventional motivations. The unconventional story struck Crowther, who wrote that the film “is not, we’lllasure, the most brillian...
Variety’s $1.5 million cutoff for a box-office success (4 Jan. 1950, 59). But how much of this success was due to packaging and marketing strategies the studio could have applied to boost receipts for any film, and how much was due to favorable responses to this film? Let us consider some of the packaging and marketing strategies the studio applied.

The full-page ad already quoted was one of three ads for The Fountainhead. Warner Brothers ran in Variety between 18 May and 29 June 1949. No other studio ran three ads of any size for a single picture during this period, and Warner Brothers itself ran full-page ads—and just one apiece—for only three other pictures. We might surmise that most of the business coming from such heavy advance promotion would be early in the release period, and that favorable word of mouth would cause business to pick up—or at least keep it from dropping off sharply—deeper into the run. Another factor that could have produced an early peak in business was the appeal of the film’s star, Gary Cooper. At the end of 1949, Variety ranked the top 25 box-office draws of the year according to “a cold-blooded dollar appraisal based on the past year’s product.” Cooper was 22nd on this list of “the small handful of players who could be counted on to bring in at least $1 million a year.” Also, Warner Brothers hoped this appeal of this “10-million-reader best-seller” would bring to life. No doubt the studio counted on some of these millions joining Cooper’s fans during the first weeks of the run and then spreading word-of-mouth—which, Variety predicted, would be “either entirely pro or con, there being no middle ground to public acceptance of Rand’s philosophy” (29 June 1949, 14).

The Variety prediction was accurate and public response was mostly con. As might be expected, the heavy promotion and big name caused an early surge in business, placing The Fountainhead first among newcomers in its first week. Meanwhile, The Red Menace, a Republic picture released the week before, made the same box-office report but placed well behind The Fountainhead. This was on July 13. Where was The Fountainhead three weeks later? What had it been doing so decent business in cities, it had dropped to “runner-up” status on the list of national box-office leaders, while The Red Menace—which had been in release longer and featured a “cast of unknowns”—ranked higher, at number nine. In comparison, The Fountainhead had peaked early and vanished quickly, owing its strongest response to elements other than ones that very many viewers had found intrinsic to the film.

We might suppose that word-of-mouth and reviews were bad because The Fountainhead was a deliberate attempt at objective philosophy trying to pass as entertainment. But if the lesson had been found to be agreeable, or at least harmless, then this loquacious film ought to have simply vanished without causing the outrage among some reviewers (and maybe patrons) that it did. But Rand had entered the fray with the “valorization” of Hollywood and proceeded as though in a vacuum (Dargnut 17). It is not surprising that the result was out of step with Hollywood fare of the day and that it has since failed to typify very much about cold war America in 1949. We might make an anti-critique approach to The Fountainhead, and look for clues in the film’s source and character precisely where it deviates from the prevailing national currents of its time.

One of Michael Paul Rogn’s distinctions can help us. He writes that “cold war ideology established a divide in the United States, with the free market, capitalism, and free state and the slave state on the other” (240). Importantly, he adds that cold war movies show “the historical displacement of the first opposition by the second” (240). David Riesman registered and promoted this displacement while it was in process. In an essay titled “Individualism Reconsidered,” he wrote that “such terms as ‘society’ and ‘individual’ tend to pose a false as well as a shifting dichotomy” (26). He went on, after redefining individualism, to claim that “as so defined, society, the larger territorial organism, often provides the mechanisms by which the individual can be protected against the group” (26). This essay’s appearance in Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays marked its third appearance in four years. As such it seems reasonable to find the essay indicative of the same influential cold war conception of the individual that Rogn observes. Riesman’s essay is especially useful to us because Riesman wrote it just months after the July release of The Fountainhead.

At a time when the reigning conception of the individual was not literally of the individual, but of individuals within a militarily protected free state—a collective of free individuals—Rand loudly proclaimed the rights of the literal individual above all collectives and collective laws. While Americans were picturing themselves surrounded by an unseen enemy, one that was probably on the move inside the collective—seeking new hosts, infiltrating, propagating, and threatening the collective from within—Rand projected an image of an individual alone against open sky, triumphant and free (even though he had no difficulty in finding an American property), thoroughly exposed on all sides, utterly invulnerable all by himself. This brand of individualism—which Riesman certainly would have labeled one of the “older brands of ruthless individualism” (26)—suggests why Variety criticized the “anarchistic social point of view” (29 June 1949, 14) and Crowther decried the “utter contempt for the idea of people that this picture passionately proclaims” (17 July 1949, sec. II: 1). Crowther went on—“It is, by some specious dialectic, society itself which becomes a cruel and indefeasible ‘collective’ against the freedom of the individual man”—and on, hammering the point repeatedly.

If Miss Rand intended this drama to be a warning against the present threat of militant Communism ‘muscling in’ on our free democracy, then she might have shown a little more confidence in the good old body politic and a little less glowering admiration for the genius who is a law unto himself. (17 July 1949, sec. II: 1)

The ire might have truly puzzled Rand. Roark’s speech did contain all the right buzzwords. Cooper intoned with proper gravity: “Our country, the noblest country in the history of men, was based on the principle of individualism, the principle of man’s inalienable rights. It was a country where a man was free to seek his own happiness.” This—the same rhetoric that decorated calendars in kitchens and barbershops and classrooms all across late-1940s America—ought to have pushed the right buttons in any decade. The sentiments seem eminently reasonable, so what happened? One mistake was the psychological deadness at the heart of the film. Another was the untimely literalness of the individualist theme. A third mistake was the lopsided depiction of two antipodal entities.

In each of two kinds of cold war movie, good and evil are together inscribed on the same level of all abstracted characters from their careers. In films like I Was a Communist for the FBI (1943) and Pickup on South Street (1953), true-hearted Americans function, behave, and appear as such, and communists likewise act according to their label. The Red Menace—to take a less (and nearly simultaneous) release that made less money but made it longer—“waves the flag of freedom just like The Fountainhead, but also features plenty of nameless individuals, men who stand high in the business community, the “commissary agents” and “fellow travelers” who circulate in the narrative. In this kind of cold war movie, the “distance” from the representations of good and evil to their real-world referents is “short.”

In films like Thieves! (1954) and Inversion of the Body Snatchers (1956), true-hearted Americans are still, loosely speaking, “the good guys,” but they are figured more as denizens of planet earth than, specifically, as Americans. “Science fiction films presented an unfettered, homogeneous social world,” Rogn observes (263). This work must be related to representations of the Red Menace as giant radioactive ants or plants that hatch from pods and transform into soulless replicas of the folks next door. Arguing within a framework that splits American cultural history into “moments of demology,” Rogn writes, “from each moment the free man has both depended on and defined himself in opposition to his subversive twin” (237). Rogn’s observation strikes at the heart of why Rand’s cold war movie was (and is) uniquely unsatisfying as such.

The Fountainhead is explicit without naming names or, more accurately, it only names half of them. Rand holds up America as the noblest country in the history of men, and has Roark talk at length about the thing that is at that moment threatening to destroy it. But Roark never mentions communism. Leaving the subversive twin in the shadows—no matter how much sacralizing rhetoric is piled on—leaves the free man somewhat undefined as
well. Had she kept both referents under the surface, both behind the signs (as cold war science fiction does) then Rand’s fuzzily defined collectivists would have corresponded (and counterweighted) an undifferentiated homogenous social world wherein Americans would recognize an America that was not explicitly named as such. Rand’s canted discourse lifts one term above the surface and sinks the other down below it. The film denounces and denounces it as a name. Despite its not name, and we are made to see the fuzziness of the enemy, the too-diffuse meaning of “collectivism,” violates the sensibilities of a public that was embracing its own collective identity especially tightly in 1949. Robert Ellsworth needs to testify before HUAC to commit himself to “indulge himself in the luxury of individual morality” (Navasky 73). Rand’s out-of-step hero not only could, but did, elevate this indulgence to an American sacramental right.

If the film does not embody the collective ethos of its first audiences, what does it embody? If it has never been widespread or had a consensus on the content of its thought. Den Uyl and Rasmussen describe her “uncompromising defense of laissez-faire capitalism” (ix) while Durgan finds the novel attacking big business (31). Rand defies pat like 5S’s, Broun writes that her ideas were “unpopular, among both liberals and conserv-ative” (201), and Den Uyl and Rasmussen set out to show why “Rand cannot be labeled as a conservative or a liberal” (x). Phrases cropping up in some characterizations of Rand’s thought suggest associations that are more aligned to her borrowings of rhetoric from the American Revolution and Constitu-
tion. Peter Biskind subtitled an essay on the film “The Fountainhead and The Triumph of the Will” (316) and Durgan describes Rand’s devotion to “ego-über-alles” (31). The inten-
tion here is not to expose a fascist but to suggest that such allusions may help us problematize the ways in which American Right system Rand puts forward in the film. The hovering third person raises the possibility that, in Rand’s secret thought, democracy and communism might be more on the same side of the fence than she or her characters would care to admit.

The novel’s Reader’s Digest biographical note, which quotes Rand coming to the United States from Russia “in order to write as I please” (88); and simmers in the novel, for example, when Roark tells the jury that “there is so such thing as a collective brain” (680).

Rather than trace a seam of collective war attitudes into this film, we can identify an author’s calculation into the screenplay—vigorously an imagined to emerge. In the novel, the threat seemed di-

The collective she targeted most explicitly in 1949 was not the United States, but hints of a broader anti-Americanism showed through cracks, in characterizations and events that would make viewers like Crowther sour at the utter lack of confidence in any body politic. Through one crack the film’s arch collectivist, Ellsworth Toohey, reveals his loathsome in force when he organizes the staff of the Banner into a walkout to protest the paper’s stand on the Conrad Hilton affair. Despite the non-case—this at a time when Hollywood itself had reached a hundred percent unionized (May 128). But labor unions are collectives and, quite unconstrained by national trends toward their widespread formation, Rand detested them. Moreover, her film’s ultimate political stance is the one that corresponds to the “anti-Americanism” (because they are too original) and the unnamed totalitarian regime that is at present de-

The enemy on Rand’s hit list is more basic and ubiquitous than a red menace.

Like the novel published a year earlier, an article signed by Rand in the January 1944 Reader’s Digest makes no mention of brainless, soulless robots and puts the emphasis squarely on dictators. But the film appeared five years later when U.S. relations with the U.S.S.R. had cooled so fast, why does it step short of naming communism. They now, it seems, observes something clear in Wood’s question above, that “in 1947 the wartime friendship between the United States and Russia was still a fresh memory” (488). Lingering freshness is perhaps why the film, two years later, turns up heat on communism but still does not name it. In 1943 Rand left communism not only unnamed but barely implicated at all. We might define the collec-
tion of collectivists that most explicitly targeted fascism. The novel and the Reader’s Digest piece appear soft on communism, but when Rand wrote them, how did she feel?

When Wood pressed harder, she responded, “You don’t have to come out and denounce Russia during the war, no. You can keep quiet. There is no moral gap between disapproving something if you can’t say it” (Bentley 118). Rand kept quiet before the 1947 hearings, and in the 1949 film, the virtil bubbled hotter but remained under the surface. But it was always there. In the Reader’s Digest biographical note, which quotes Rand coming to the United States from Russia “in order to write as I please” (88); and simmers in the novel, for example, when Roark tells the jury that “there is so such thing as a collective brain” (680).

Rather than trace a seam of collective war attitudes into this film, we can identify an author’s calculation into the screenplay—vigorously an imagined to emerge. In the novel, the threat seemed di-

The enemy on Rand’s hit list is more basic and ubiquitous than a red menace.

Like the novel published a year earlier, an article signed by Rand in the January 1944 Reader’s Digest makes no mention of brainless, soulless robots and puts the emphasis squarely on dictators. But the film appeared five years later when U.S. relations with the U.S.S.R. had cooled so fast, why does it step short of naming communism. They now, it seems, observes something clear in Wood’s question above, that “in 1947 the wartime friendship between the United States and Russia was still a fresh memory” (488). Lingering freshness is perhaps why the film, two years later, turns up heat on communism but still does not name it. In 1943 Rand left communism not only unnamed but barely implicated at all. We might define the collec-
tion of collectivists that most explicitly targeted fascism. The novel and the Reader’s Digest piece appear soft on communism, but when Rand wrote them, how did she feel?

When Wood pressed harder, she responded, “You don’t have to come out and denounce Russia during the war, no. You can keep quiet. There is no moral gap between disapproving something if you can’t say it” (Bentley 118). Rand kept quiet before the 1947 hearings, and in the 1949 film, the virtil bubbled hotter but remained under the surface. But it was always there. In the Reader’s Digest biographical note, which quotes Rand coming to the United States from Russia “in order to write as I please” (88); and simmers in the novel, for example, when Roark tells the jury that “there is so such thing as a collective brain” (680).

Rather than trace a seam of collective war attitudes into this film, we can identify an author’s calculation into the screenplay—vigorously an imagined to emerge. In the novel, the threat seemed di-

The enemy on Rand’s hit list is more basic and ubiquitous than a red menace.
sense surfaces:
It is almost impossible to convey to a free people what it is like to live in a totalitarian dictatorship. I can tell you a lot of details. I can never completely convince you, because you are free. . . . Try to imagine what it is like to be in constant terror. (Bentley 119)
The constant terror that so imprinted Rand was not that of an unseen menace. The specificity and immediacy of the source of her anticommunism set it apart from the cold-war phantasms of American moviegoers. Rogen writes that “the free man and the military state are not two alternative poles in American ideology, nor are they merely a recent symbiosis. Their marriage goes back to the beginning” (240). This was not the case for Rand. The culture that produced her possessed no such legacy, and her aversion to “melting pot” assimilative processes sealed off her chances of absorbing it. This cold war movie was out of step because its author was, by experience and inclination, an outsider to the world of her audience.
What do we see when we look at this monolith moving through American history? Guesses about wordings, emphases, and shades of directness that might ease a private vision into the hearts of millions. Where reception bears out the correctness of a calculation, we see reflected something like a cold war zeitgeist. Where receptions turn cold, we see a personal agenda laid bare. Riesman noted “that the meaning of ‘individualism’ depends on the historical setting,” which better explains reactions to this film than it does this film (26). For that one is better off looking elsewhere.

The Fountainhead confronts us with two distinct genre of cold war movie because the impulse of its author to discharge her worst—at the collective she hated most—was checked, and tipped out of working order, by her impulse to gauge and appease post-war political correctness. In 1947, when she criticized the 1943 pro-Soviet film, Song of Russia, Rand seemed most outraged by one line. She testified, “Here is the line, as nearly exact as I could mark it while watching the picture: ‘I have a great responsibility to my family, to my village, and the way I have lived.’ What way had she lived? This is just a polite way of saying the Communist way of life.” (Bentley 115). The title of Crowther’s attack on “In Glass House” (17 July 1949, sec. II: 1) might be applied here, for two years later, by referring to the name herself, Rand would author something distinctly un-American.

Robert Spadoni
University of Chicago

Notes
1 Changes made to characters other than Roark suggest this shift as well. For example, Ellsworth Tookey tries to set Peter Keating in his place for a major design project in the novel: “there’s not another architect living who can equal Peter Keating in efficiency, taste, originality, imagination” (397). In the film, “Now, the grace of Peter Keating’s personality lies in the fact that there is no personality stamped on his buildings.”

2 Dargart holds his position despite these evasions. He claims, for example, that when Vider wanted to change the ending, he asserted that—like Roark—he had the right to destroy his work if the studio prevented him from completing it as he wished (34). The possibility spectral story indicates Dargart’s predilection to see Vider as a somewhat barbarous, other and Rand as a highly accommodated one. Elsewhere Dargart queries Rand’s “Dostoievsky” in Dominique Francon (”In full face at last, Patricia Neil bears a resemblance to Ayn Rand?”—32), leaving Roark open for equation to Vider.

3 This description of the Vider Rand working relationship typifies two sorts of claims that, separately, have tended to characterize Rand and Vider’s work. Rand is often seen as a woman of a source of ideas and influence. In Branden’s The Fountainhead Rand’s eyes are “alive with an intensity of belief” that had never imagined human eyes could hold. They seemed the eyes of a human being who was composed of the power of sight . . . . I saw them function with concentration on a new idea or question that had not occurred to her before” (xv). A more recent treatment—this of her philosophy—starts off with a pledge to “move the discussion away from the emotional aura surrounding Ayn Rand” (Ben Uyti and Rasmussen x) By contrast, Vider and his work are often characterized by “energetic” and its synonyms (see Dargart 33, for example). Typically—and by comparison—Vider is found to be less imposing agendas to projects. For example, Dargart finds in the director’s sensibilities, first, a reflection of Hollywood’s (20), then of Rand’s (31); and film encyclopedia Ephraim Katz celebrates the brilliance and virtuosity of Vider’s style before describing the content of his later films as reflecting, mainly, concern with the box-office (1950). Taken together, the consistency of Rand’s “passion” and Vider’s “energy” suggest that their relationship on the project was as Branden describes it—and as Crowther insisted that “King Vider has fully illustrated” what “Miss Rand has written” (9 July 1949, 8).

4 The cut line was, “I wished to come here and say that I am a man who does not exist for others” (212), the gilt of which is expressed several times in the courtroom speech alone.

5 In order to Vider for the actors’ behavior and speaking might be, is at least in part, to credit him with too much. Branden reports that Rand privately coached Cooper’s delivery of the courtroom speech (209).

The dates and page numbers of the acts: May 18, 12; June 21, 29; and June 12, 19.

7 The three other films: Colorado Territory, 25 May, 12; Always Leave Them Laughing, 8 June, 4; and The Girl from Jones Beach, 15 June, 17.

8 Advertisement in Variety, 18 May 1949, 12.

9 Box-office report in Variety, 13 July 1949, 3.

10 Rev. of Red Menace in Variety, 25 May 1949, 8.


12 It might be argued that an anti-zeitgeist approach is still a zeitgeist approach and therefore just as problematic. I claim no understanding of how a film can consistently acquire aims and reflections of a “time” that is not it. But the notion of a zeitgeist to be a critical discursive entity with potentially useful heuristic properties, and I invoke the notion where I see it resonating helpfully in proximity with other entities—films, for example; and to some other entities I ascribe (in this essay and generally) attributes and origins that are archetypical to the idea of a zeitgeist.

13 The two other appearances were in: A. William Loos, ed., Religious Faith and World Culture (Pentacle-Hall, 1951); and City Lights vol. 1 no. 3, 1953.

14 Riesman mentions in a bracketed note that he writes in early 1950 (36).

15 See the last page of the novel and the last shot of the film.

16 A January 1944 Reader’s Digest article by Rand exhibits the same tendency: “Individualism holds that man is an independent entity with an inalienable right to the pursuit of his own happiness in a society where men deal with one another in equals” (88).


18 Such overlaps made statements unusual at the height of Soviet’s allied World War II effort seem respect a few years later. For example, when Leila Rogers testified at the 1947 HUAC hearings, she omitted the story of how her daughter Ginger had been required to speak jegop in the 19-3 Dalton Trempu picture called Tender Comrade (the off-screen line—“Share and share alike, that’s democracy.”) (Savakly 79)

19 For example, in Dr. Strangelove (1964)—just before the world ends—the top echelons of the United States and Soviet governments emerge in a fascist dream of survival in apocalyptic warfare.

20 Without necessarily implying anything about England and collectivism, the films Tookey’s account centers on one of Hollywood’s older tropes, Christ’s persecutions frequently sip up an air of malignant imporiums with the help of the idea...

21 Perhaps I cannot ignore the novel’s enduring popularity completely. It takes many more patrons to make a Hollywood film has to wait a second printing. First prints are sometimes the beginning of a “run” that lasts for decades, which permitts week of month to spread slowly and followings to build gradually. Branden quotes Roark’s novel: “I did not know that I was predicting my own future when I described the process of Roark’s success: ‘It was an underground stream flowed through the country and broke out in sudden spouts that shot to the top of Cornelis’s tower, in untapped plants’ (1947). Such mysterious and winding patterns down the road to the box office. There are other factors as well—for example, Rand’s skills as a writer, which have a greater and more direct impact in a longer work (in a medium of more than a bare attempt or the film).

The Fountainhead/233
Works Cited


