
Department of Philosophy Speaker Series

"Outcomes, Luck, and Blameworthiness "

Matthew Talbert

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How should we think about moral responsibility and moral blameworthiness for the causal outcomes of behavior, and what is the relationship between responsibility and blameworthiness in this context? In this paper, I outline a framework for answering this question. Whether a person is morally responsible for an outcome partly depends on whether certain causal relations obtain between that person and the outcome. I argue, however, that moral blameworthiness is independent of causation. So, blameworthiness and moral responsibility come apart in an unexpected way: while we can be morally responsible for bad outcomes, we cannot be blameworthy for them. Neither the occurrence of an outcome, nor an agent's causal relation to that outcome, nor their moral responsibility for it, affect that agent's blameworthiness. I'll try to motivate this conclusion by considering various causally complex instances of agency.



Friday, March 24
4:00 p.m.
Seminar Room 280F
Inamori International Center for
Ethics and Excellence

Tinkham Veale University Center

