POWER AND POWERLESSNESS

Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley

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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS
Urbana Chicago London
1980

PREFACE

Near the Cumberland Gap, stretching between the Pine and Cumberland Mountains across parts of Tennessee and Kentucky, lies the Valley about which this book is written. Of the many experiences remembered from that summer when I first entered the Valley, one perhaps marks my introduction to the questions here pursued. With a community organizer in the area, I had climbed a narrow path to a mountain cabin to talk to a retired miner about joining with others in a law suit challenging the low taxation of the corporate coal property which surrounded his home. The miner listened attentively to the account of the local injustices which several other students and I had 'discovered'. He showed no surprise, though his response might have been anticipated. The land of his father had been taken by the coal lords. He knew of the inequities in the Valley since.

In this opportunity to move against one of the long-standing inequities, though, the miner showed no particular interest. His response did not seem one of apathy or ignorance. It seemed to grow from past experiences in the Valley, as well as from his situation in the present. The miner understood something of powerlessness, of power, and of how the two could serve to maintain inaction upon injustice, even in a 'democracy'. Of that knowledge, my rather traditional schooling at the nearby university had taught me very little.

I had read the theories of democracy, about how victims of injustice in an 'open system' are free to take action upon their concerns, about how conflicts emerge and are resolved through compromises amongst competing interests. Overlooking the Valley from the miner's porch, what I saw seemed to question the lessons I had learned. Like many throughout Central Appalachia, the Valley is rich in natural resources, especially coal, yet its people remain poor: estimates here suggested that up to 70 per cent of the families remained below the poverty line, while up to 30 per cent were unemployed. Though the Valley is endowed with land abundant

for its several thousand residents, the people are landless: some 75 per cent of the land—over 60,000 acres—is owned and controlled by a single corporate owner, the American Association, Ltd., a British company, controlled (at the time) by Sir Denys Lowson, a former Lord Mayor of London and one of Britain's wealthiest men. Blessed with natural beauty, the resources of the Valley stand raped: unreclaimed strip (open cast) mining in layers along the mountains has left the landscape scarred, the hillsides eroded, the creeks and bottom lands filled with silt, acid and coal. A glance at the miner's gnarled hands and the sound of his weak lungs reminded me that deep mining, too, had taken its toll. In the United States a miner is killed every other day, one is injured every ten minutes, and those that survive stand a three in four chance of getting black lung (a chronic disease from inhaling minute particles of black coal dust). There is little compensation in the community for what is lost at work: services from the county courthouse, reached via a dangerous road, are few. All around inequalities abound.

But the inequalities in the Valley, especially those between the community and the Company, seemed not to provoke challenge. The chief executive officer of the county insisted that there were no particular problems in the coal-producing portion of the county. Neither did the once strong and militant union, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), seem at the time to be a source of challenge to the *status quo*. In fact, many of the miners in the Valley were non-union, or belonged to a small, company-dominated workers' association. Against corporate exploitation and government neglect, nowhere in the Valley did there appear to be organized protest. I began to wonder if I would not do better to turn my traditional political science around: to ask not why rebellion occurs in a 'democracy' but why, in the face of massive inequalities, it does not.

I began to read literature which challenged some of the more élitist democratic theories to which I had previously been exposed. Still fresh from my experience in the Valley, I attempted to develop a more adequate explanation for what I had seen. In situations of inequality, the political response of the deprived may be seen as a function of power

relationships. Power works to develop and maintain the quiescence of the powerless. Rebellion, as a corollary, may emerge as power relationships are altered. Together, patterns of power and powerlessness can keep issues from arising, grievances from being voiced, and interests from being recognized.

To suggest that quiescence (or rebellion) might be related to power was to plunge immediately into an extended and lively debate in political science. What is the meaning of power? How can we tell who has it and who has not? When is it exercised, and with what effects? In Part I of this book Chapter 1 picks up the debate, examining three approaches to the study of power and arguing that each carries with it a particular understanding of political inaction in the face of inequality. In the traditional pluralists' approach, power is understood primarily in terms of who participates, who gains and who prevails in decision-making about key issues. The phenomenon of quiescence is separated from the study of power. The pluralists' approach has been challenged by a second school which argues that power may work to limit the actions of the relatively powerless through a 'mobilization of bias' that prevents certain issues and actors from gaining access to the decision-making process. The second view has been extended by a third view which suggests that power not only may limit action upon inequalities, it also may serve to shape conceptions of the powerless about the nature and extent of the inequalities themselves. In his book, (Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*) the proponent of this view sketches a 'three-dimensional' approach to power, which he claims 'offers the prospect of a serious sociological and not merely personalized explanation of how political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or even from being made'. (p. 38).

The second and third views of power seemed to contain the beginnings of a theory relating power to participation or non-participation, but it was unclear exactly how this might occur in the life of a given community. I decided to return to the Valley with a twofold task: first, to see if the theories of power could be applied usefully to better understanding the realities of political action and belief of the primarily

white and rural, poor and working people of a place like Central Appalachia; and secondly, to see if the empirical examination itself could illuminate further the theoretical interrelationships of power and powerlessness, quiescence and rebellion in situations of inequality.

The task has been avoided in the past at least partially because of the methodological difficulties it was thought to present. How can we study that which does not occur? How can we see the so-called 'hidden faces' of power? What about problems of objectivity, of making assumptions about what people might want? Though difficulties are present, I shall argue that they are not insurmountable. In Part II, a historical approach helps to document the shaping in the past of roles or routines of power which continue in the present, without visible conflict. In Part III,the maintenance of quiescence in the contemporary Valley is examined by identifying specific mechanisms of power from 'below', i.e. from the perspective of the powerless. In Part IV, participant observation in the process of challenge or attempted challenge helps to confirm the extent to which patterns of power and powerlessness preclude issues from arising or actors from acting. Throughout, differing responses of the Valley's people to various opportunities for action or inaction in their 'boom and bust' history help to provide evidence for assessing the impact of power upon them.

Chapter 2 argues that the quiescence of the Central Appalachian Valley is not unique in America. Rather, the starkness of its inequalities and the exaggerated character of the power relationships may make more visible patterns of behaviour and belief which are found amongst non-élites elsewhere. As it involves an extremely poor community in the midst of abundant wealth, the case of the Appalachian Valley poses questions about the politics of poverty relevant to America's lower class generally. As it is about miners and their families, the study consideres broader questions about working-class consciousness, and union and industrial power. As much of the under-developed area is owned and dominated by a British-based corporation, an understanding of the situation involves examining the contemporary role of the multinational in the affairs of a local community, as well as

the means through which protest may emerge against landholders who are corporate and absentee.

The empirical study begins in Chapter 3 by examining the impact of industrial power at the end of the nineteenth century upon a traditional, rural people in and around the Cumberland Gap of Kentucky and Tennessee.

In Chapter 4, the historical study continues with an examination of power relationships in the coal camps of the 1920s and 1930s followed by a study of miners' movements to win their rights to organize a union, and to have their voices heard within it.

In the Valley, the inequalities and the power relationships surrounding them continue today very much as they were historically established, as is suggested in Chapter 5. Chapters 6 and 7 look at the responses to those inequalities as they occur in two potential modes of challenge: local politics and the local union. In the local political arena, a view 'from the bottom' indicates that the 'vulnerability' of the non-élite may account for the failure of issues of inequality to appear on the decision-making agenda.

In the UMWA, corruption and autocracy were challenged in the late 1960s by a rank and file organization known as the Miners for Democracy, led by Jock Yablonski, who was murdered for his protests. Using previously unavailable trial and union records, Chapter 7 examines the opposition of the miners in the Valley to the reform movement. It suggests that the case provides further illustration of the means by which power may serve to protect the powerholder, even to the extent of shaping the perceptions of the powerless about a given conflict.

In Chapter 8, the emergence of challenge against the British company which mines and minds the Valley's resources begins to indicate the elements of power and powerlessness which must be overcome for protest to occur. While the possibilities for effective action by a relatively powerless group may be limited in any situation, Chapter 9 suggests that the difficulties may be even greater for the non-élite of a rural community attempting to bypass the local élite and to influence an absentee target.

In that they focus upon differing aspects of the community

at differing points in its history, each of the empirical chapters may be seen to an extent as separate case studies. This allows a comparative approach within the single situation itself. Yet it is also likely that only in the accumulation of power amongst the various aspects and moments in community life will its full effect upon the actions and conceptions of the powerless become understood. These interrelationships as well as the consequences of the case for a more general understanding of power and powerlessness, quiescence and rebellion will be the subject of the Conclusion, Chapter 10.

In the process of relating theoretical notions of social science to various aspects of everyday community life, much is left undone. Theoretically, I have not considered the difficult question of the boundaries that separate power and structure. Methodologically, the stress on processes of power as they militate against change may have led me to underplay the significance of the challenges that have occurred. Empirically, I have not explored fully the impact of certain socialization institutions—especially education and religion—upon power relationships.

While these are clear limitations to the study, I hope that the interplay of perspectives will have facilitated other contributions. From the consideration of the specific case I hope will come a more general theory of the impact of power and powerlessness upon the political actions and conceptions of a deprived group. From the illustration of a method for examining the 'three dimensions' of power I hope will come stimulus for further exploration of the theory in other situations. And, from the application of both theory and method a better understanding has been brought to myself, and I hope to others, of the persistent politics of inequality in this often overlooked region of Central Appalachia.

Along the way, I have benefited from the assistance of many people, to whom I am grateful. Within the Appalachian region, I have learned from those whose wisdom grows from experiences in confronting power, and powerlessness, in striving for social change; as well as from the advice of social scientists who have undertaken more formal research in the area. For archives and research materials, thanks go to the

Filson Club of Louisville, Kentucky for permission to peruse and quote the papers of C. B. Roberts; to the United Mine Workers' Research Department in Washington D.C. for access to the union records and for assistance in exploring them; to the Model Valley Oral History Video Project, for permission to view, transcribe and quote their tapes; to the Highlander Research and Education Center, the Kentucky State Archives, the Tennessee State Library and Archives, as well as to persons in numerous other county courthouses, government offices, and community organizations.

In Oxford, I benefited further from the comments of those who read and discussed earlier portions or drafts of this work, especially Peter Bachrach, Juliet Merrifield, Clyde Mitchell, David Price, Jim Sharpe and Philip Williams. I am particularly grateful to my Oxford supervisor, Steven Lukes, for the combination of enthusiastic support and thoughtful criticism which he provided along the way. For finance and facilities, I thank Nuffield College, the Rhodes Scholarship Trust, and the Highlander Center. Very special thanks go to Anna Baer for patiently and unselfishly typing the manuscript.

Most of all, I am indebted in this study to the people of the Clear Fork Valley. Since that summer in 1971, they have continued to teach, in more ways than they know.

1

POWER AND PARTICIPATION

This is a study about quiescence and rebellion in a situation of glaring inequality. Why, in a social relationship involving the domination of a non-élite by an élite, does challenge to that domination not occur? What is there in certain situations of social deprivation that prevents issues from arising, grievances from being voiced, or interests from being recognized? Why, in an oppressed community where one might intuitively expect upheaval, does one instead find, or appear to find, quiescence? Under what conditions and against what obstacles does rebellion begin to emerge?

The problem is significant to classical democratic and Marxist theories alike, for, in a broad sense, both share the notion that the action of the dispossessed will serve to counter social inequities. Yet, as these views move from political theory to political sociology, so, too, do they appear to move—particularly with reference to the United States—from discussing the necessities of widespread participation and challenge to considering the reasons for their non-occurrence.[1] In their wake, other more conservative theories of democracy present the appearance of quiescence in the midst of inequality as evidence of the legitimacy of an existing order, or as an argument for decision-making by the few, or at least as a phenomenon functional to social stability.[2] More recently, these 'neo-élitists' have in turn been challenged by others who, with C. Wright Mills, argue that the appearance

[1] See, for instance, Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (Harper and Row, New York, 1972); Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies* (Hutchinson University Library, London, 1973).

[2] i.e. the so-called 'neo-élitists' such as Schumpeter (*Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 1942), Berelson (*Voting*, 1954), Dahl (*A Preface to Democratic Theory*, 1956). The views are neatly summarized and contrasted with classical theories of participation in Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1970).

of quiescence need neither suggest consent nor refute the [illegible] ideals.[3] Rather, it may reflect the use or misuse of [illegible] power.

[illegible] theories of democracy turn, at least to a degree, [illegible] as to the significance of quiescence, the [illegible] literature of industrial societies offers an array [illegible] explanations for its roots: embourgeoisement, hegemony, [illegible] inequality, low rank on a socio-economic status scale, cultural deficiencies of the deprived, or simply the innate apathy of the human race—to name but a few. Rather than deal with these directly, this study will explore another explanation: in situations of inequality, the political response of the deprived group or class may be seen as a function of power relationships, such that power serves for the development and maintenance of the quiescence of the non-élite. The emergence of rebellion, as a corollary, may be understood as the process by which the relationships of power are altered.

The argument itself immediately introduces a further set of questions to be explored: what is the nature of power? How do power and powerlessness affect the political actions and conceptions of a non-élite?

In his recent book, *Power: A Radical View*, Lukes has summarized what has been an extended debate since C. Wright Mills, especially in American political science, about the concept and appropriate methods for its study.[4] Power, he suggests, may be understood as having three dimensions, the first of which is based upon the traditional pluralists' approach, the second of which is essentially that put forward by Bachrach and Baratz in their consideration of power's second face,[5] and the third of which Lukes develops. In this chapter, I shall examine the dimensions briefly, arguing that each carries with it, implicitly or explicitly, differing

[3] See, for example, Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (University of London Press, 1969); Jack E. Walker, 'A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy', *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1966), 285–95.

[4] Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (Macmillan, London, 1974).

[5] Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'The Two Faces of Power', *American Political Science Review*, 56 (1962), 947–52; and Bachrach and Baratz, *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1970).

assumptions about the nature and roots of participation and non-participation. I shall argue further that together the dimensions of power (and powerlessness) may be developed into a tentative model for more usefully understanding the generation of quiescence, as well as the process by which challenge may emerge. Finally, I shall sketch in general terms a methodology by which the notions may be considered empirically. Then, in Chapter 2, I shall begin to specify how the notions might apply to the study of the politics of inequality in a Central Appalachian Valley.

1.1 THE NATURE OF POWER AND ROOTS OF QUIESCENCE

The One-Dimensional Approach. The one-dimensional approach to power is essentially that of the pluralists, developed in American political science most particularly by Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby. 'My intuitive idea of power', Dahl wrote in an early essay, 'is something like this: A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.'[6] In the politics of a community, Polsby later added, power may be studied by examining 'who participates, who gains and loses, and who prevails in decision-making'.[7]

The key to the definition is a focus on behaviour—doing, participating—about which several assumptions are made, to be questioned later in this book. First, grievances are assumed to be recognized and acted upon. Polsby writes, for instance, that 'presumably people participate in those areas they care about the most. Their values, eloquently expressed by their participation, cannot, it seems to me, be more effectively objectified.'[8] Secondly, participation is assumed to occur within decision-making arenas, which are in turn assumed to be open to virtually any organized group. Again, Polsby writes, 'in the decision-making of fragmented government—and American national, state and

[6] Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', in Roderick Bell, David M. Edwards, R. Harrison Wagner, eds., *Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Free Press, New York, 1969), p. 80, reprinted from *Behavioural Science*, 2 (1957), 201–5.

[7] Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1963), p. 55.

[8] Nelson W. Polsby, 'The Sociology of Community Power; A Reassessment', *Social Forces*, 37 (1959), 235.

local government are nothing if not fragmented—the claims of small intense minorities are usually attended to'.[9] In his study of New Haven Dahl takes a similar view:

> In the United States the political system does not constitute a homogenous class with well-defined class interests. In New Haven, in fact, the political system is easily penetrated by anyone whose interests and concerns attract him to the distinctive political culture of the stratum . . . The independence, penetrability and heterogeneity of the various segments of the political stratum all but guarantee that any dissatisfied group will find a spokesman . . .[10]

Thirdly, because of the openness of the decision-making process, leaders may be studied, not as élites, but as representative spokesmen for a mass. Polsby writes, 'the pluralists want to find about leadership's role, presumed to be diverse and fluid'.[11] Indeed, it is the conflict amongst various leaders that ensures the essential responsiveness of the political game to all groups or classes. As Dahl puts it, 'to a remarkable degree, the existence of democratic ceremonials that give rise to the rules of combat has insured that few social elements have been neglected for long by one party or the other'.[12]

Within the one-dimensional approach, because a) people act upon recognized grievances, b) in an open system, c) for themselves or through leaders, then *non-participation* or *inaction* is not a political problem. For Polsby it may be explained away with 'the fundamental presumption that human behaviour is governed in large part by inertia'.[13] Dahl distinguishes between the activist, *homo politicus*, and the non-activist, *homo civicus*, for whom 'political action will seem considerably less efficient than working at his job, earning more money, taking out insurance, joining a club, planning a vacation, moving to another neighbourhood or city, or coping with an uncertain future in manifold other ways . . .'.[14] The pluralists argue that by assuming political action rather than inaction to be the problem to be

[9] Polsby (1963), op. cit., p. 118.
[10] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961), pp. 91, 93.
[11] Polsby (1963), op. cit., p. 119.
[12] Dahl (1961), op. cit., p. 114.
[13] Polsby (1963), op. cit., p. 116.
[14] Dahl (1961) op. cit., p. 221.

explained, their methodology avoids the 'inappropriate and arbitrary assignment of upper and middle class values to all actors in the community'[15]—i.e. the value of participation. Yet, the assumption itself allows class-bound conclusions. Dahl's characterization of *homo civicus* is certainly one of a citizen for whom there are comfortable alternatives to participation and relatively low costs to inaction. And for Polsby, the assumption of inertia combines with the assumption of an open system to allow the conclusion, without further proof, that class consciousness has not developed in America because it would be 'inefficient' or 'unnecessary'.[16]

The biases of these assumptions might appear all the more readily were this approach strictly applied to the quiescence of obviously deprived groups. Political silence, or inaction, would have to be taken to reflect 'consensus', despite the extent of the deprivation. Yet, rarely is the methodology thus applied, even by the pluralists themselves. To make plausible inaction among those for whom the status quo is not comfortable, other explanations are provided for what appears 'irrational' or 'inefficient' behaviour. And, because the study of non-participation in this approach is sequestered by definition from the study of power, the explanations must generally be placed within the circumstance or culture of the non-participants themselves. The empirical relationship of low socio-economic status to low participation gets explained away as the apathy, political inefficacy, cynicism or alienation of the impoverished.[17] Or other factors—often thought of as deficiencies—are put forward in the non-political culture of the deprived group, such as in the 'amoral familism' argument

[15] Polsby (1963), op. cit., p. 116.
[16] ibid., p. 118.
[17] For examples of this approach see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton University Press, 1963), especially chaps. 7–8; Lester W. Milbraith, *Political Participation* (Rand, McNally and Co., Chicago, 1965); Stein Rokkan, *Approaches to the Study of Political Participation* (The Christian Michelson Institute for Science and Intellectual Freedom, Bergen, 1962); Peter H. Rossi and Zahava D. Blum, 'Class, Status and Poverty', in Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., *On Understanding Poverty* (Basic Books, New York, 1968), pp. 36–63. For more general discussions of this literature see S.M. Lipset, *Political Man* (William Heinemann, London, 1959), especially pp. 170–219; or, more recently, Verba and Nie, op. cit.

of Banfield in reference to Southern Italy.[18] Rather than examining the possibility that power may be involved, this approach 'blames the victim' for his non-participation.[19] And it also follows that by changing the victim—e.g. through remedial education or cultural integration—patterns of non-participation will also be changed. Increased participation, it is assumed, will not meet power constraints.

Even within its own assumptions, of course, this understanding of the political behaviour of deprived groups is inadequate. What is there inherent in low income, education or status, or in rural or traditional cultures that itself explains quiescence? If these are sufficient components of explanation, how are variations in behaviour amongst such groups to be explained? Why, for instance, do welfare action groups spring up in some cities but not in others? Why are the peasantry of southern Italy quiescent (if they are), while the *ujamaa* villagers of Tanzania are not? Why do rural farmers of Saskatchewan form a socialist party while those in the rural areas of the southern United States remain 'backward'?[20] If most blacks are of a relatively low socio-economic status, why did a highly organized civil rights movement develop, and itself alter patterns of political participation?

In short, as operationalized within this view, the power of A is thought to affect the action of B, but it is not considered a factor relevant to why B does not act in a manner that B otherwise might, were he not powerless relative to A. That point, among others, is well made by those who put forward the two-dimensional view of power.

The Two-Dimensional Approach. 'It is profoundly characteristic', wrote Schattschneider, that 'responsibility for widespread nonparticipation is attributed wholly to the ignorance, indifference and shiftlessness of the people.' But, he continued:

> There is a better explanation: absenteeism reflects the suppression of the options and alternatives that reflect the needs of the nonparticipants.

[18] Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of Backward Society* (Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958).

[19] See William Ryan, *Blaming the Victim* (Pantheon Books, New York, 1971).

[20] Contrast Lipset's earlier work, *Agrarian Socialism* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1950) with his later work, *Political Man*, op. cit., pp. 258–9.

> It is not necessarily true that people with the greatest needs participate in politics most actively—whoever decides what the game is about also decides who gets in the game.[21]

In so writing, Schattschneider introduced a concept later to be developed by Bachrach and Baratz as power's 'second face', by which power is exercised not just upon participants within the decision-making process but also towards the exclusion of certain participants and issues altogether.[22] Political organizations, like all organizations, develop a 'mobilization of bias . . . in favour of the exploitation of certain kinds of conflict and the suppression of others . . . Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.'[23] And, if issues are prevented from arising, so too may actors be prevented from acting. The study of politics must focus 'both on who gets what, when and how and who gets left out and how'[24]—and how the two are interrelated.

When this view has been applied (explicitly or implicitly) to the political behaviour of deprived groups, explanations for quiescence in the face of inequalities have emerged, which are quite different from those of the one-dimensional view. For instance, Matthew Crenson, in his extended empirical application of the 'non-issues' approach, *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution*, states that 'while very few investigators have found it worthwhile to inquire about the political origins of inaction . . .', in Gary, Indiana, 'the reputation for power may have been more important than its exercise. It could have enabled U.S. Steel to prevent political action without taking action itself, and may have been responsible for the political retardation of Gary's air pollution issue.'[25] Or, Parenti, in his study of urban blacks in Newark, found that

[21] E.E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1960), p. 105.

[22] Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and (1970), op. cit. See, too, the same authors', 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework', *American Political Science Review*, 57 (1963), 641–51.

[23] ibid., p. 8, quoting Schattschneider, op. cit., p. 71.

[24] ibid., p. 105.

[25] Matthew A. Crenson, *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decision-Making in the Cities* (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971), pp. 130, 80.

[26] Michael Parenti, 'Power and Pluralism: A View From the Bottom', *Journal of Politics*, 32 (1970), 501–30.

in city hall the 'plurality of actors and interests . . . displayed remarkable capacity to move against some rather modest lower-class claims'. 'One of the most important aspects of power', he adds, is 'not to prevail in a struggle but to predetermine the agenda of struggle—to determine whether certain questions ever reach the competition stage.'[26] Salamon and Van Evera, in their work on voting in Mississippi, found patterns of participation and non-participation not to be related to apathy amongst low status blacks as much as to 'fear' and 'vulnerability' of these blacks to local power élites.[27] Similarly, in his extensive study, *Peasant Wars,* Wolf found acquiescence or rebellion not to be inherent in the traditional values or isolation of the peasantry, but to vary 'in the relation of the peasantry to the field of power which surrounds it'.[28]

In this view, then, apparent inaction within the political process by deprived groups may be related to power, which in turn is revealed in participation and non-participation, upon issues and non-issues, which arise or are prevented from arising in decision-making arenas. But though the second view goes beyond the first, it still leaves much undone.

Empirically, while the major application of the approach, that by Crenson, recognizes that 'perceived industrial influence, industrial inaction, and the neglect of the dirty air issue go together', it still adds 'though it is difficult to say how'.[29]

Even conceptually, though, this second approach stops short of considering the full range of the possibilities by which power may intervene in the issue-raising process. While Bachrach and Baratz insist that the study of power must include consideration of the barriers to action upon grievances, they equally maintain that it does not go so far

[27] Lester Salamon and Stephen Van Evera, 'Fear, Apathy and Discrimination: A Test of Three Explanations of Political Participation', *American Political Science Review,* 67 (1973), 1288–1306.

[28] Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (Faber and Faber, London, 1969), pp. 276–302 generally, and especially p. 290.

[29] Crenson, op. cit., p. 124. Also, Crenson's study is more one of inaction amongst decision-makers on a single issue rather than of passivity amongst non-élites who may be outside the decision-making process altogether. See critique by Edward Greer, 'Air Pollution and Corporate Power: Municipal Reform Limits in a Black Community', *Politics and Society,* 4 (1974), 483–510.

as to include how power may affect conceptions of grievances themselves. If 'the observer can uncover no grievances', if 'in other words, there appears to be universal acquiescence in the status quo', then, they argue, it is not 'possible, in such circumstances, to determine empirically whether the consensus is genuine or instead has been enforced'.[30]

However difficult the empirical task, though, their assumption must be faulted on two counts. First, as Lukes points out, 'to assume the absence of grievance equals genuine consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definitional fiat'.[31] Secondly, though, the position presents an inconsistency even within their own work. They write further:

> For the purposes of analysis, a power struggle exists, overtly or covertly, either when both sets of contestants are aware of its existence *or when only the less powerful party is aware* of it. The latter case is relevant where the domination of status quo defenders is so secure and pervasive that they are oblivious of any persons or groups desirous of challenging their preeminence.[32]

But, if the power of the 'defenders of the *status quo*' serves to affect their awareness that they are being challenged, why cannot the powerlessness of potential challengers similarly serve to affect their awareness of interests and conflict within a power situation? That is, just as the dominant may become so 'secure' with their position as to become 'oblivious', so, too, may such things as routines, internalization of roles or false consensus lead to acceptance of the *status quo* by the dominated. In short, I shall agree with Lukes that the emphasis of this approach upon observable conflict may lead it to neglect what may be the 'crucial point': 'the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place'.[33]

The Three-Dimensional Approach. In putting forward a further conception of power, Lukes argues that 'A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests.'[34] The means by which A may do so go significantly

[30] Bachrach and Baratz (1970), op. cit., pp. 49–50.

[31] Lukes, op. cit., p. 24.

[32] Bachrach and Baratz (1970) op. cit., p. 50 (emphasis supplied).

[33] Lukes, op. cit., pp. 20, 23.

[34] ibid., p. 34.

beyond those allowed within the first two approaches. First, 'A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but *he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.*'[35] Not only might A exercise power over B by prevailing in the resolution of key issues or by preventing B from effectively raising those issues, but also through affecting B's conceptions of the issues altogether. Secondly, 'this may happen in the absence of observable conflict, which may have been successfully averted', though there must be latent conflict, which consists, Lukes argues, 'in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the *real interests* of those they exclude'.[36] Thirdly, the analysis of power must avoid the individualistic, behavioural confines of the one- and to some extent the two-dimensional approaches. It must allow 'for consideration of the many ways in which *potential issues* are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals' decisions'.[37] In so extending the concept of power, Lukes suggests, 'the three-dimensional view . . . offers the prospect of a serious sociological and not merely personalized explanation of how political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or even from being made'.[38]

Though the prospect has been offered, the task has yet to have been carried out. To do so, though, might bring together usefully approaches often considered separately of the relationship of political conceptions to the social order. For instance, following in a line of American political scientists (beginning perhaps with Lasswell), the emphasis upon consciousness allows consideration of the subjective effects of power, including Edelman's notion that 'political actions chiefly arouse or satisfy people not by granting or withholding their stable, substantive demands but rather by changing their demands and expectations'.[39] At the same

[35] ibid., p. 23 (emphasis supplied).
[36] ibid., pp. 24–5.
[37] ibid., p. 24.
[38] ibid., p. 38.
[39] Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (Markham Publishing Co., Chicago, 1971), p. 8.

time, by not restricting power to individuals' actions, the three-dimensional definition allows consideration of the social forces and historical patterns involved in Gramsci's concept of hegemony, or what Milliband develops as the use of ideological predominance for the 'engineering of consent' amongst the subordinate classes.[40]

Perhaps more significant, however, are the implications of this three-dimensional approach for an understanding of how power shapes participation patterns of the relatively powerless. In a sense, the separation by the pluralists of the notion of power from the phenomenon of quiescence has indicated the need for such a theory, while in the second and third approaches are its beginnings. In the two-dimensional approach is the suggestion of barriers that prevent issues from emerging into political arenas—i.e. that constrain conflict. In the three-dimensional approach is the suggestion of the use of power to pre-empt manifest conflict at all, through the shaping of patterns or conceptions of non-conflict. Yet, the two-dimensional approach may still need development and the three-dimensional prospect has yet to be put to empirical test.

This book therefore will pick up the challenge of attempting to relate the three dimensions of power to an understanding of quiescence and rebellion of a relatively powerless group in a social situation of high inequality. Through the empirical application further refinements of the notion of power may develop, but, of equal importance, more insights may be gleaned as to why non-élites in such situations act and believe as they do.

1.2 THE MECHANISMS OF POWER

What are the mechanisms of power? How might its components be wielded in the shaping or containment of conflict?

First Dimension. In the first-dimensional approach to power, with its emphasis on observable conflict in decision-making

[40] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of . . .* ed. and trans., by Quinton Hare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971), see especially selections of 'State and Civil Society', in pp. 206–78. Ralph Milliband, *The State in Capitalist Society: An Analysis of the Western Systems of Power* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969), pp. 180–2.

arenas, power may be understood primarily by looking at who prevails in bargaining over the resolution of key issues. The mechanisms of power are important, but relatively straightforward and widely understood: they involve the political resources—votes, jobs, influence—that can be brought by political actors to the bargaining game and how well those resources can be wielded in each particular play—through personal efficacy, political experience, organizational strength, and so on.

Second Dimension. The second-dimensional approach adds to these resources those of a 'mobilization of bias',

> A set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures ('rules of the game') that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests.[41]

Bachrach and Baratz argue in *Power and Poverty* that the mobilization of bias not only may be wielded upon decision-making in political arenas, but it in turn is sustained primarily through 'non-decisions', defined as:

> A decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision maker. To be more nearly explicit, nondecision-making is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are voiced, or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all of these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process.[42]

One form of non-decision-making, they suggest, may be force. A second may be the threat of sanctions, 'negative or positive', 'ranging from intimidation . . . to co-optation'. A third may be the 'invocation of an existing bias of the political system—a norm, precedent, rule or procedure—to squelch a threatening demand or incipient issue'. This may include the manipulation of symbols, such as, in certain political cultures, 'communist' or 'troublemaker'. A fourth process which they cite 'involves reshaping or strengthening the mobilization of bias' through the establishment of new barriers or new

[41] Bachrach and Baratz (1970), op. cit., p. 43.
[42] ibid., p. 44.

symbols 'against the challengers' efforts to widen the scope of conflict'.

While the above mechanisms of power involve identifiable actions which prevent issues from entering the decision-making arenas, there may be other processes of non-decision-making power which are not so explicitly observable. The first of these, 'decisionless decisions', grows from institutional inaction, or the unforeseen sum effect of incremental decisions. A second process has to do with the 'rule of anticipated reactions', 'situations where B, confronted by A who has greater power resources decides not to make a demand upon A, for fear that the latter will invoke sanctions against him'.[43] In both cases, the power process involves a non-event rather than an observable non-decision.

Third Dimension. By far the least developed and least understood mechanisms of power—at least within the field of political science—are those of the third dimension. Their identification, one suspects, involves specifying the means through which power influences, shapes or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations of latent conflict. This may include the study of social myths, language, and symbols, and how they are shaped or manipulated in power processes.[44] It may involve the study of communication of information—both of what is communicated and how it is done.[45] It may involve a focus upon the means by which social legitimations are developed around the dominant, and instilled as beliefs or roles in the dominated.[46] It may involve, in short, locating the power processes behind the social construction of meanings and patterns[47] that serve to get B to act and believe in a

[43] ibid., pp. 42–6.
[44] See, for instance, Edelman, op. cit.; Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1967); and Edelman, 'Symbols and Political Quiescence', *American Political Science Review*, 54 (1960), 695–704.
[45] For example, as developed by Claus Mueller, *The Politics of Communication: A Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization and Legitimation* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1973).
[46] ibid.; see, too, Milliband, op. cit., pp. 179–264; and C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1956), pp. 36–40.
[47] This is to suggest that processes may be similar to those suggested by Berger and Luckmann but that the processes are not random. They occur in a power field and to the advantage of power interests. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Doubleday and Co., New York,

manner in which B otherwise might not, to A's benefit and B's detriment.

Such processes may take direct observable forms, as Lukes suggests. 'One does not have to go to the lengths of talking about Brave New World, or the world of B. F. Skinner to see this: thought control takes many less total and more mundane forms, through the control of information, through the mass media, and through the process of socialization.'[48] His assertions are supported in various branches of contemporary social science. For instance, Deutsch and Rieselbach, in writing of new developments in the field, say that communications theory 'permits us to conceive of such elusive notions as consciousness and the political will as observable processes'.[49] Similarly, the study of socialization, enlightened by learning theory, may help to uncover the means by which dominance is maintained or legitimacy instilled, as Mann or Frey, among others, argue.[50]

In addition to these processes of information control or socialization, there may be other more indirect means by which power alters political conceptions. They involve psychological adaptations to the state of being without power. They may be viewed as third-dimensional effects of power, growing from the powerlessness experienced in the first two dimensions. Especially for highly deprived or vulnerable groups, three examples might be given of what shall be called the *indirect* mechanisms of power's third dimension.

In the first instance, the conceptions of the powerless may alter as an adaptive response to continual defeat. If the victories of A over B in the first dimension of power lead to non-challenge of B due to the anticipation of the reactions of A, as in the second-dimensional case, then, over time, the calculated withdrawal by B may lead to an unconscious pat-

1966); and critique by Richard Lichtmann, 'Symbolic Interaction and Social Reality: Some Marxist Queries', *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 15 (1970) 75–94.

[48] Lukes, op. cit., p. 23.

[49] Karl W. Deutsch and Leroy Rieselbach, 'Recent Trends in Political Theory and Political Philosophy', *The Annals of the American Political and Social Science*, 360 (1965), 151.

[50] Michael Mann, 'The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy', *American Sociological Review*, 35 (1970). Frederick W. Frey, 'Comment: On Issues and Non-Issues in the Study of Power', *American Political Science Review*, 65 (1971), 1081–1101.

tern of withdrawal, maintained not by fear of power of A but by a sense of powerlessness within B, regardless of A's condition. A sense of powerlessness may manifest itself as extensive fatalism, self-deprecation, or undue apathy about one's situation. Katznelson has argued, for instance, in *Black Men, White Cities* that 'given the onus of choice, the powerless internalize their impossible situation and internalize their guilt . . . The slave often identified with his master and accepted society's estimate of himself as being without worth . . . The less complete but nonetheless pervasive powerlessness of blacks in America's northern ghettos . . . has had similar effects.'[51] Or, the powerless may act, but owing to the sense of their powerlessness, they may alter the level of their demands.[52] The sense of powerlessness may also lead to a greater susceptibility to the internalization of the values, beliefs, or rules of the game of the powerful as a further adaptive response—i.e. as a means of escaping the subjective sense of powerlessness, if not its objective condition.[53]

The sense of powerlessness may often be found with, though it is conceptually distinct from, a second example of the indirect mechanisms of power's third dimension. It has to do with the interrelationship of participation and consciousness. As has been seen in the pluralists' literature, it is sometimes argued that participation is a consequence of a high level of political awareness or knowledge, most often associated with those of a favourable socio-economic status. However, it might also be the case, as is argued by the classical democratic theorists, that it is participation itself which increases political consciousness—a reverse argument from the one given above.[54] Social psychology studies, for instance, have found that political learning is dependent at least to

[51] Ira Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities* (Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 198.

[52] Walter Korpi, 'Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation', *American Political Science Review*, 68 (1974). Korpi writes, 'in the long run the weaker actor will, through internal psychological processes, tend to adjust his aspiration level towards the going rates of exchange in the relationship'. (p. 1571).

[53] See discussion by Paulo Freire, *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx, 1972), pp. 1–39.

[54] e.g. Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, G.D.H. Cole. See discussion of this theme in Pateman, op. cit., Chap. 3.

some degree of political participation within and mastery upon one's environment.[55] And, as Pizzorno points out, there is a 'singular relationship, well known by all organizers of parties and political movements: class consciousness promotes political participation, and in its turn, political participation increases class consciousness'.[56] If this second understanding of the relationship to participation and consciousness is the case, then it should also be the case that those denied participation—unable to engage actively with others in the determination of their own affairs—also might not develop political consciousness of their own situation or of broader political inequalities.

This relationship of non-participation to non-consciousness of deprived groups is developed by Paulo Freire, one of the few writers to have considered the topic in depth. 'Consciousness', he writes, 'is constituted in the dialectic of man's *objectification* and *action* upon the world.'[57] In situations of highly unequal power relationships, which he terms 'closed societies', the powerless are highly dependent. They are prevented from either self-determined action or reflection upon their actions. Denied this dialectic process, and denied the democratic experience out of which the 'critical consciousness' grows, they develop a 'culture of silence'. 'The dependent society is by definition a silent society.' The culture of silence may preclude the development of consciousness amongst the powerless thus lending to the dominant order an air of legitimacy. As in the sense of powerlessness, it may also encourage a susceptibility among the dependent society to internalization of the values of the dominant themselves. 'Its voice is not an authentic voice, but merely an echo of the metropolis. In every way the metropolis speaks, the dependent society listens.'[58] Mueller similarly writes about groups which 'cannot articulate their interests or perceive social conflict. Since they have been socialized into compliance, so to speak, they accept the definitions of political reality as offered by dominant groups, classes or government institutions.'[59]

[55] Melvin Seeman, 'Alienation, Membership, and Political Knowledge: A Comparative Study', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (1966), 353–67.

[56] Allesandro Pizzorno, 'An Introduction to the Theory of Political Participation', *Social Science Information*, 9 (1970), 45.

[57] Paulo Freire, *Cultural Action for Freedom* (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx, 1972), p. 52.

[58] ibid., pp. 58–9.

[59] Mueller, op. cit., p. 9.

Even as the 'silence' is broken, the initial demands of the dominated may be vague, ambiguous, partially developed. This might help to explain the phenomenon of the 'multiple' or 'split' consciousness[60] often cited in the literature for poor or working-class groups. As long as elements of the sense of powerlessness or the assuming consciousness that grow from non-participation can be maintained, then although there may be a multitude of grievances, the 'unified' or 'critical' consciousness will likely remain precluded. And, in turn, the inconsistencies themselves may re-enforce the pattern of non-challenge. In Gramsci's terms, 'it can reach the point where the contradiction of conscience will not permit any decision, any choice, and produce a state of moral and political passivity'.[61]

This understanding gives rise to a final indirect means through which power's third dimension may work. Garson has described the 'multiple consciousness' as being characterized by 'ambiguity and overlays of consciousness; different and seemingly contradictory orientations will be evoked *depending upon the context*'.[62] If such is the case, then the consciousness of the relatively powerless, even as it emerges, may be malleable, i.e. especially vulnerable to the manipulation of the power field around it. Through the invocation of myths or symbols, the use of threat or rumours, or other mechanisms of power, the powerful may be able to ensure that certain beliefs and actions emerge in one context while apparently contradictory grievances may be expressed in others. From this perspective, a consistently expressed consensus is not required for the maintenance of dominant interests, only a consistency that certain potentially key issues remain latent issues and that certain interests remain unrecognized—at certain times more than at others.

These direct and indirect mechanisms of power's third dimension combine to suggest numerous possibilities of the means through which power may serve to shape conceptions

[60] David Garson, 'Automobile Workers and the American Dream', *Politics and Society*, 3 (1973), 163–179; Antonio Gramsci, trans. by Lewis Marks, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings* (International Publishers, New York, 1957), p. 66.

[61] Gramsci (1957), op. cit., p. 67.

[62] Garson, op. cit., p. 163.

of the necessities, possibilities, or strategies of conflict. Not only, as in the two-dimensional approach, might grievances be excluded from entering the political process, but they might be precluded from consideration altogether. Or, B, the relatively powerless, may recognize grievances against A, the relatively powerful, but desist from challenge because B's conceptions of self, group, or class may be such as to make actions against A seem inappropriate. Or, B may recognize grievances, be willing to act upon them, but not recognize A as the responsible agent towards which action should be directed—e.g. because of the mystifications or legitimations which surround A. Or, B may recognize grievances against A and be willing to act, but may not through viewing the order as immutable or through lacking conceptions of possible alternatives. Or, B may act, but do so on the basis of misconceived grievances, against the wrong target, or through an ineffective strategy. Any or all of these possibilities may serve the same purpose of protecting A's interests owing to B's shaped conceptions of potential conflict, to B's detriment.

But the indirect mechanisms of power's third dimension, seen as a consequence of the powerlessness experienced in the first two, have suggested yet a further consideration: the dimensions of power, each with its sundry mechanisms, must be seen as interrelated in the totality of their impact. In that simple idea lies the basis for developing a more coherent theory about the effects of power and powerlessness upon quiescence and rebellion in situations of great inequality.

1.3 POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION—A TENTATIVE RELATIONSHIP

Power, it has been suggested, involves the capacity of A to prevail over B both in resolution of manifest conflict and through affecting B's actions and conceptions about conflict or potential conflict. Intuitively, if the interests of A and B are contrary, and if A (individual, group, class) exercises power for the protection of its interests, then it will also be to A's advantage if the power can be used to generate and maintain quiescence of B (individual, group, class) upon B's interests. In that process, the dimensions of power and



1.1 Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion – A Tentative Scheme

powerlessness may be viewed as interrelated and accumulative in nature, such that each dimension serves to re-enforce the strength of the other. The relationships may be schematized, as in Figure 1.1, and described as follows:[63]

As A develops power, A prevails over B in decision-making arenas in the allocation of resources and values within the political system [1]. If A prevails consistently, then A may accumulate surplus resources and values which may be allocated towards the construction of barriers around the decision-making arenas—i.e. towards the development of a mobilization of bias, as in the second dimension of power [2]. The consistent prevalence of A in the decision-making arenas plus the thwarting of challenges to that prevalence may allow A further power to invest in the development of dominant images, legitimations, or beliefs about A's power through control, for instance, of the media or other socialization institutions [3]. The power of A to prevail in the first dimension increases the power to affect B's actions in the second dimension, and increases the power to affect B's conceptions in the third.

The power of A is also strengthened by the fact that the powerlessness of B is similarly accumulative, and that power and powerlessness may each re-enforce the other towards the generation of B's quiescence. In the decision-making arena, B suffers continual defeat at the hands of A [4]. Over time, B may cease to challenge A owing to the anticipation that A will prevail [5]. But B's non-challenge allows A more opportunity to devote power to creating barriers to exclude participation in the future [2, 5]. The inaction of B in the second-dimensional sense becomes a sum of the anticipation by B of defeat and the barriers maintained by A over B's entering the decision-making arena anyway, and the re-enforcing effect of one upon the other.

In turn, the second-dimensional relationship may re-enforce the sense of powerlessness, the maintained non-participation, the ambiguous consciousness, or other factors which comprise the indirect mechanisms of power's third dimension [5, 6]. Further withdrawal of B though, in turn, allows more security

[63] This is not meant to imply that in an empirical situation the relationships develop in this sequence, or in a linear fashion at all. However, it is analytically useful to describe them in this manner.

for A to develop further legitimations or ideologies which may be used indirectly to affect the conceptions of B [3, 6]. And, as has been seen, the powerlessness of B may also increase the susceptibility of B to introjection of A's values. In the third-dimensional sense, then, B's response becomes understood as the sum of B's powerlessness and A's power, and the re-enforcing effects of the one upon the other.

Once such power relationships are developed, their maintenance is self-propelled and attempts at their alteration are inevitably difficult. In order to remedy the inequalities, B must act, but to do so B must overcome A's power, and the accumulating effects of B's powerlessness. In order to benefit from the inequalities, A need not act, or if acting, may devote energies to strengthening the power relationships. Indeed, to the extent that A can maintain conflict within the second- or third-dimensional arenas, then A will continue to prevail simply through the inertia of the situation. Pocock describes what may have been such a relationship with reference to the maintenance of power by Ancient Chinese rulers:

> Where A has the power and B has not, it is a sign of weakness for either to take initiative, but B must take it and A need not . . . Once acquired, it (power) is maintained not by exertion but by inaction; not by imposing norms, but by being prequisite to their imposition; not by the display of virtue, but by the characterless force of its own necessity. The ruler rules not by solving other's problems, but by having none of his own; others have problems—i.e. they desire the power he has—and by keeping these unsolved he retains the power over them.[64]

In such a situation, power relationships can be understood only with reference to their prior development and their impact comprehended only in the light of their own momentum.

Challenge, or rebellion, may develop if there is a shift in the power relationships—either owing to loss in the power of A or gain in the power of B. (The two need not be the same owing to the possibility of intervention by other actors, technological changes, external structural factors, etc.) But even as challenge emerges, several steps in overcoming power-

[64] J. G. A. Pocock, 'Ritual, Language and Power', in Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (Methuen, London, 1970), p. 69.

lessness by B must occur before the conflict is on competitive ground.[65] B must go through a process of *issue and action formulation* by which B develops consciousness of the needs, possibilities, and strategies of challenge. That is, B must counter both the direct and indirect effects of power's third dimension [9]. And, B must carry out the process of *mobilization of action upon issues* to overcome the mobilization of bias of A against B's actions. B must develop its own resources —real and symbolic—to wage the conflict [8]. Only as the obstacles to challenge by B in the second and third dimensions are overcome can the conflict which emerges in the first dimension be said to reflect B's genuine participation—i.e. self-determined action with others similarly affected upon clearly conceived and articulated grievances [7].

This formulation of the steps in the emergence of effective challenge provides further understanding of the means by which A may prevail over the outcome of any latent or manifest conflict. In the first instance, A may simply remain aloof from B, for to intervene in a situation of potential conflict may be to introduce the notion of conflict itself. But, if conceptions or actions of challenge do arise on the part of B, A may respond at any point along the process of issue-emergence. That is, the powerless may face barriers to effective challenge in the processes of the formulation of issues, of the mobilization of action upon issues, or in the decision-making about issues—any or all of which may affect the outcome of the conflict [10, 11, 12 . . .]. What are for B barriers to change are for A options for the maintenance of the status quo.

But, by the same token, as the barriers are overcome, so, too, do A's options for control lessen. And, just as the dimensions of power are accumulative and re-enforcing for the maintenance of quiescence, so, too, does the emergence of challenge in one area of a power relationship weaken the power of the total to withstand further challenges by more than the loss of a single component. For example, the development of consciousness of an issue re-enforces the likelihood of attempted action upon it, in turn re-enforcing consciousness.

[65] Parenti, op. cit., calls this the problem of political capital accumulation: 'just as one needs capital to make capital, so one needs power to use power'. (p. 527).

A single victory helps to alter inaction owing to the anticipation of defeat, leading to more action, and so on. Once patterns of quiescence are broken upon one set of grievances, the accumulating resources of challenge—e.g. organization, momentum, consciousness—may become transferable to other issues and other targets.

For this reason, the development and maintenance of a generalized pattern of quiescence of B by A in situations of latent conflict will always be in A's interests. A will act to thwart challenges by B regardless of whether they appear, in the immediate sense, to be directed against A; for once the patterns are broken, the likelihood of further action by B increases and the options for control wielded by A decrease. For this reason, too, A will support A' on matters of common interest *vis-à-vis* the behaviour and conceptions of B; and B must ally with B' for the emergence of effective challenge against A—giving rise over time to social grouping and social classes of the relatively powerful and the relatively powerless.

1.4 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

What may appear conceptually useful may not correspond to actual circumstance. That which is analytically distinct may in fact occur simultaneously. Thus, a primary task of this study is to consider whether this model of power and participation can be applied to an empirical situation and whether that process in turn can lend further understanding to the relationships so far put forward. That there are methodological difficulties to the task is recognized from the outset. The suggestion of Bachrach and Baratz of even a 'second face' of power met vocal challenge on procedural grounds: how can one find the 'hidden' aspects of power? How can a non-decision be observed? Which non-events are relevant?[66] The presentation of a 'third face' of power poses yet further problems: how can one study what does not happen? What about the problem of imputing interests and

[66] For example, Raymond E. Wolfinger, 'Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 65 (1971), 1063–1080; also, 'Rejoinder to Frey's Comment', *American Political Science Review*, 65 (1971), 1102–4; Richard M. Merelman, 'On the Neo-Elitist Critiques of Community Power', *American Political Science Review*, 62 (1968), 451–60; Polsby (1963), op. cit.

values? This book argues that these problems are surmountable. Broad guidelines used for the empirical study are presented here. Then, the telling test for the method, as for the model, will be the extent to which it helps to illuminate the empirical case itself.

In the first instance, the methodology assumes Frey's suggestion that 'we can expect non-issues when: 1) glaring inequalities occur in the distribution of things avowedly valued by actors in the system, and 2) those inequalities do not seem to occasion ameliorative influence attempts by those getting less of those values'.[67] Secondly, rather than assuming the inaction or inertia to be 'natural' in the mass and activism as the phenomenon to be explained (as is done in the pluralist methodolody), this approach initially assumes that remedial action upon inequalities by those affected would occur were it not for power relationships. The study of quiescence in a situation of potential conflict becomes the task, rather than the study of manifest conflict in a situation otherwise assumed to be conflict-free.

It is not adequate, however, merely to observe that inequalities exist and that such inequalities are met only by quiescence, to conclude that non-challenge is a product of power. As Lukes questions, 'Can we always assume that the victims of injustice and inequality would, but for the exercise of power, strive for justice and equality?'[68] On the contrary, he writes, 'we need to justify our expectation that B would have thought and acted differently, and we need to specify the means or mechanisms by which A has prevented, or else acted (or abstained from acting) in a manner sufficient to prevent B from doing so'.[69] From the model put forward, I suggest there are several means in an empirical study through which mechanisms can be identified and through which 'relevant counterfactuals' can be demonstrated to substantiate the expectation that B would have thought and acted differently, were it not for A's power.

[67] Frey, op. cit., p. 1097. This is essentially the approach used by Crenson, who objectively identifies varying levels in air pollution, assumes that people generally do not want to be poisoned, and asks why action upon pollution does not occur.

[68] Lukes, op. cit., p. 46.

[69] ibid., pp. 41-2.

In general, to do so requires going outside the decision-making arenas and carrying on extensive, time-consuming research in the community in question. There, non-actors and non-leaders become important, not as objects of scrutiny in themselves but to discover through their experiences, lives, conditions, and attitudes, whether and by what means power processes may serve to maintain non-conflict.

In pursuing the answer to the question more specifically, it may be necessary, first, to look at the historical development of an apparent 'consensus'. In so doing, it may be possible to determine whether that situation has been arrived at by 'choice' or whether it has been shaped by power relations. And, the background study may help to identify certain key symbols, cues, or routines that affect the maintenance of quiescence in a given situation but which may not be identifiable as part of the 'language of power' without knowledge of their antecedents.

Secondly, within a given situation of apparent non-challenge, processes of communication, socialization, acculturation, etc., can be studied to determine whether there is a specific relationship between the actions or ideologies of the powerholders and the action, inaction or beliefs of the powerless. In addition, it might be possible to determine whether the conditions do exist under which the actions and consciousness of B could develop, or whether identifiable power barriers serve to preclude their development, as in the indirect mechanisms of power.

Thirdly, it might be possible in a given or changing situation to posit or participate in ideas or actions which speculate about or attempt to develop challenges. The response of the quiescent population to such possibilities, and the response of the powerholders to the beginning formulation or raising of issues may help to show whether power mechanisms are at work to preclude challenge from emerging.

Even if the identification of specific processes of power is successful, it still does not satisfy the requirement of justifying the 'expectation that B would have thought and acted differently'. Several more types of evidence must be gathered. First, as Lukes suggests, it may be possible to observe what occurs on the part of B when the power of A over B weakens,

i.e. in 'abnormal times . . . when the apparatus of power is removed or relaxed'.[70] Secondly, it may be possible to observe what occurs when alternative opportunities for action develop within B's field—through the intervention of third parties or new resources. If action or conceptions of action emerge upon previously existing conditions—whether due to alteration in the power of A or the powerlessness of B—then it may be possible to argue that the prior inaction or apparent consensus did not reflect real consensus. Finally, it may be possible to develop a comparative approach to the study of the problem: if similarly deprived groups are faced with observably differing degrees of power, and if one rebels while the other does not, then it should be possible to argue that the differing responses are related to differences in the power relationships.

If, after following such guidelines, no mechanisms of power can be identified and no relevant counterfactuals can be found, then the researcher must conclude that the quiescence of a given deprived group is, in fact, based upon consensus of that group to their condition, owing for instance, to differing values from those initially posited by the observer. In this sense, this approach allows the falsifiability of the hypothetical relationships being explored.[71] Moreover, the 'third-dimensional methodology' provides the possibility of reaching conclusions that power in a given situation is either three- or two- or one-dimensional in nature—a possibility not provided for in the other two approaches. Thus, the conclusions of this approach are less dependent upon the methodological assumptions than they might be in the approach of the pluralists' or of Bachrach and Baratz.

However, assumptions must be made in this, as in all studies of power, about the definitions of three key concepts: interests, consciousness and consensus.

For the observer to posit that B would act towards the attainment of a value X or would want X were it not for the power processes of A may involve avowing that X is in B's interest. However, to do so—unlike it is often alleged[72]—is

[70] ibid., p. 47.

[71] See, for instance, critique by Merelman, op. cit.

[72] See, for instance, Polsby (1963), op. cit., p. 96; Wolfinger 'Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics', op. cit., p. 1066.

not necessarily to avow that X is in B's real interest, nor to give the observer the right to impose his interpretation of what is B's interest upon B. Rather, the observer's interpretation of what appears in a given context to be in B's interest may be used as a methodological tool for discovering whether power relationships are such as to have precluded the active and conscious choice by B about such interests, regardless of what the outcome of that choice actually would be. What B would choose (were B free from the power of A to do so) would be B's real interests—but they do not require identification for the study of power. That B is prevented from acting upon or conceiving certain posited interests is sufficient to show that the interests that are expressed by B are probably not B's real ones.[73]

The stance has ramifications for the consideration of consciousness. The unfortunate term 'false consciousness' must be avoided, for it is analytically confusing. Consciousness refers to a *state*, as in a state of being, and thus can only be falsified through negation of the state itself. If consciousness exists, it is real to its holders, and thus to the power situation. To discount it as 'false' may be to discount too simply the complexities or realities of the situation. What is far more accurate (and useful) is to describe the content, source, or nature of the consciousness—whether it reflects awareness of certain interests and not of others, whether it is critical or assuming, whether it has been developed through undue influence of A, and so on.

To argue that existing consciousness cannot be 'false' is not to argue the same for consensus. 'Real' consensus implies a prior process of agreement or choice, which in a situation of apparent consensus may or may not have been the case. The process may not have occurred; it could have been shaped or manipulated; the 'consensus' could be maintained by power processes, etc. In any event, what may appear consensus may not be what would appear were the real

[73] See discussion by William E. Connolly, 'On "Interests" in Politics', *Politics and Society*, 2 (1972), 459-77. This definition is similar to Connolly's that: 'Policy X is more in A's interest than policy Y if A, were he to *experience* the results of both X and Y, would *choose* X as the result he would rather have for himself.' (p. 472). However, less emphasis is put on the ability to experience the unforeseen consequences of a given choice; more on the process of making the choice itself.

process to take place. The investigation of the possibility that power processes have given rise to a 'false' consensus must be carried on to establish more accurately the nature of the first appearance.

Examples: The Closed and Colonial Societies. Even with the help of these methodological guidelines, the identification of power processes may be easier in some situations than in others. For instance, in his pluralist critique of Bachrach and Baratz, Wolfinger readily accepts that power relationships may affect consciousness and action in closed societies, such as the plantation South. He writes, 'Some examples of false consciousness are indisputable, e.g. the long period of feeble protest by southern Negroes. Their reticence was due in part to repression, but much of it was based on myths and procedures.' Moreover, in making such conclusions, Wolfinger attributes to the Negro certain interests (as goals) assumed to be common: 'Almost any social scientist would agree that the blacks have been manipulated, because almost any social scientists' views of rational behaviour, irrespective of their specific character, would attribute certain goals to southern Negroes.'[74] What appears to be in question in this and other pluralists' critiques, then, is not whether the hidden faces of power exist, nor whether methodological assumptions can be made in certain situations for their identification, but whether such methods can be applied to consideration of the concepts in other situations—especially those of the more 'open' industrial democracies. There, the assumption is made in the pluralists' methodology that non-conflict represents social cohesion or integration, not, as others have argued, social control or hegemony.

It may be possible to develop an explanatory theory further, though, by looking not just at the example of the closed society but at situations where penetration (or integration) have not fully occurred and in which power processes, if they are at work, may be more readily self-evident. One example of such a case might be found in the colonial or neo-colonial relationship, involving, as it does, the power of a metropolis or developed industrial society over a less developed, more traditional society.

[74] Wolfinger, 'Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics', op. cit., p. 1077.

In the first instance, the development of domination, or *the colonizing process*, involves the prevailing of the colonizer over the allocation of resources in the colony owing to superior resources of the former, such as capital, technology, or force. Secondly, however, the maintenance of that power involves the establishment of certain institutions and organizational forms. As Emerson describes:

> Imperialism spread to the world at large the ideas, techniques, and institutions which had emerged from many centuries of European history. By its direct impact . . . it established many of the forms and methods of the West abroad, inevitably disrupting in greater or lesser degree the native societies on which it encroached in the process.[75]

The establishment of dominance includes the development of an administrative relationship by the dominant society over the dominated, either through the direct control of the representatives of the former, or through the development of collaborators or mediating élites amongst the latter. It includes a prevailing ideology through which the values of the metropolis are legitimated as superior and those of the colony as inferior. In short, the colonization process involves the development of a mobilization of bias—a set of predominant values, beliefs and institutional procedures that operate systematically to the benefit of the colonizer at the expense of the colonized. It is the development of a second-dimensional power relationship.

However, writers of and about the Third World insist that there is a further form of power that grows out of the effective colonizing process—one which serves to shape the legitimacy of the colonizers' dominance. Referring to the internalization of alien norms amongst dependent societies, Balandier wrote in 1951 of the *colonial situation* which 'not only conditioned the reaction of dependent peoples but is still responsible for certain reactions of people recently emancipated'.[76] Others, such as Freire, Fanon, and Memmi have since described further the means by which the consciousness of the colonized

[75] Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of African and Asian Peoples* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 6.

[76] G. Balandier, 'The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach', in Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *Social Change: The Colonial Situation* (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966), pp. 34–61.

is affected by the values of the colonizer, as well as the extent to which the shaping is strengthened because of the sense of inadequacy or submissiveness amongst the dominated. Memmi, for instance, writes that as power develops its justifying ideology, so, too, must powerlessness:

> There undoubtedly exists—at some point in its evolution—a certain adherence of the colonized to colonization. However, this adherence is the result of colonization not its cause. It arises after and not before colonial occupation. In order for the colonizer to be complete master, it is not enough for him to be so in actual fact, but he must believe in its legitimacy. In order for the legitimacy to be complete, it is not enough for the colonized to be a slave, he must also accept this role.[77]

In short, the development of the colonial situation involves the shaping of wants, values, roles, and beliefs of the colonized. It is a third-dimensional power relationship.

Do similar processes exist within developed societies? How can one tell? Admittedly, it may be more difficult to observe whether the second and third faces of power are behind apparent quiescence amongst inequalities in more open or homogenous societies. But the difficulties in observation should not alone refute the possibilities of the occurrence. Rather than avoid the problem, it might be preferable to attempt further to develop a theory of power relationships as well as a method for their study through an intermediary step: a focus upon the perhaps more visible processes that affect a dominated but relatively non-integrated sector within industrial democracy itself. The possibility for such an exploration lies in the study of the impact of power and powerlessness upon the actions and conceptions of the people of an under-developed region of the United States known as Central Appalachia.

[77] Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Beacon Press, Boston, 1967), pp. 88–9.